The primary issue highlighted is the choice made by the controlling party of TxB to opt for an expenditure of 1,780 satoshis over the standard "pure burn" method utilized in the ephemeral anchor spend to displace TxC. This approach stands in contrast to the alternative of conducting a separate transaction that would require a payment exceeding 10,000 satoshis as per rule 3. Such a decision evidently serves as a financial incentive to encourage the expansion of the anchor, suggesting an underlying strategic motive aimed at economizing through reduced expenses.

Further elaboration on the topic suggests a potential modification to the existing setup to enhance its efficacy without incurring additional costs. The proposal includes the introduction of outputs valued at zero with an 'anyone-can-spend' clause, which would be subjected to a timelock set far into the future. This modification is designed to ensure that these outputs do not interfere with ongoing transactions within the mempool, thereby maintaining the commitment transaction's fee at zero. This innovative approach indicates a thoughtful consideration of balancing cost-efficiency while adhering to the operational constraints and regulations governing transaction management.