delvingbitcoin

An Onchain Implementation Of Mining Feerate Futures

An Onchain Implementation Of Mining Feerate Futures

Original Postby ZmnSCPxj

Posted on: February 19, 2024 00:34 UTC

The discussion revolves around a critical analysis of the mining strategy concerning blockchain transaction prioritization, particularly in scenarios of network congestion and high transaction fees.

A recent forum post highlights an inherent flaw in theoretical models which assume that miners will always opt to include the highest fee transactions in each block. This assumption falters when considering miners with a significant share of the network's total hashrate. Such miners might deliberately choose not to mine a specific transaction in a given block if they believe they can mine it in a subsequent block, thus potentially settling contracts in their favor even at the cost of omitting higher fee transactions in the immediate block.

This strategy diverges for miners holding a smaller fraction of the network hashrate, as their chances of mining a particular transaction in later blocks are minimal, forcing them to prioritize immediate high-fee transactions over any strategic considerations for future blocks. The scenario becomes even more complex under conditions of severe network congestion, where the number of transactions competing for block space exceeds the capacity significantly. In such situations, the analysis suggests that miners, irrespective of their hashrate dominance, would prioritize including the highest fee transactions available to maximize revenue from the limited block space.

An interesting hypothetical is introduced where, even if a miner knew with certainty that they would mine the next two blocks (indicating a monopolistic control over the network's hashrate), they would still prioritize other transactions over a specific contract's execution branch if the two competing transactions offered higher fees. This decision-making process underscores the economic incentives driving miners to favor transactions that maximize their earnings per block, especially under conditions where block space is at a premium due to network congestion.

The discussion concludes by positing that in scenarios where the blockchain faces congestion over several blocks, miners are incentivized to optimize their earnings by selecting the highest-paying transactions available, thereby ensuring their actions align with maximizing revenue over a series of blocks rather than on a per-block basis. This analysis serves to underline the complex interplay between transaction fees, miner strategies, and network congestion in determining the composition of blockchain transactions within each mined block.