However, a recent post highlights a significant vulnerability in the proposed theoretical model, particularly concerning miners with substantial control over the network's total hashrate. This scenario outlines how a dominant miner might decide against mining a transaction in a given block if they believe there is a high chance to mine it in subsequent blocks. This strategic decision allows them to possibly settle contracts in their favor at the expense of ignoring higher fee rate transactions in the present block. Such a strategy is viable for them due to their large share of the network's hashrate, which significantly increases their chances of mining specific transactions in the future.

On the other hand, this model presents a stark disadvantage for miners holding a smaller fraction of the network's total hashrate. These miners face a negligible likelihood of getting another opportunity to mine any transactions they pass on. Consequently, they are compelled to let the contract settle against them. To mitigate this issue, the suggestion is made to utilize average fee rates over a specified number of blocks (N blocks) and to settle discreet log contracts through the use of multiple oracles. This proposed solution aims to level the playing field, ensuring that miners, regardless of their hashrate share, have a fair chance in the mining process and contract settlements, thereby enhancing the system's overall fairness and efficiency.